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The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan 
Pritchard. London: Routledge, 2011. Pp. xxiii + 911. ISBN 978-0-415-96219-3.
The core remit of contemporary epistemology at the end of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century remains much as it was at the end of the twentieth: untangling 
the knot of issues concerning the nature of knowledge, the structure of justifica-
tion, the threat of skepticism, the clash between externalism and internalism, the 
nature and scope of the a priori and privileged self-knowledge, the plausibility and 
epistemological significance of closure principles and contextualism, and so on. 
Superficial acquaintance with contemporary epistemology might suggest that 
there isn’t really an awful lot more to it than that. This wide-ranging, comprehen-
sive, and accessible overview of epistemology should help to dispel this myth once 
and for all. The traditional concerns are very much on show here, naturally, but The 
Routledge Companion to Epistemology succeeds in showing that this is only one 
part of the picture.
The volume consists of 78 short articles, written by contributors who have more 
often than not played a definitive role in shaping the topic they are charged with 
introducing. At over 900 pages, it is clearly the product of an extraordinary effort on 
the part of all of those involved, particularly the editors. The sheer size of the vol-
ume means that I can only address a small fraction of its contents. I will begin with 
some general remarks on the volume as a whole, and then focus the remainder of 
my discussion on its treatment of skepticism. Responding to the suggestion that 
the news should give just as much attention to all the buses that make it safely to 
their destinations as to the one that crashes, Mark Corrigan very reasonably points 
out that this would take forever. For the same reason, when reviewing a volume 
of this size it is inevitable that one ends up spending a disproportionate amount of 
time pointing out things that could perhaps have been done better. But as the anal-
ogy suggests, we shouldn’t let this blind us to the countless things it gets right.
With this in mind, let me note two particular strengths of the volume. First, the 
volume boasts an unusually comprehensive and helpful section on the history of 
epistemology. What makes this so useful is not just that it covers a number of fig-
ures often neglected in this kind of volume (for instance, Leibniz, Carnap, and 
Austin), but also that so many of these essays manage to get behind the caricatures 
that figure in contemporary debates. I don’t mean to suggest that such caricatures 
have no place or play no useful role, but only that we cannot allow ourselves to lose 
sight of the fact that these historical figures were often responding to pressures 
other than those that animate contemporary epistemologists, and that their views 
are frequently considerably more nuanced than they are given credit for. The his-
tory of epistemology section of this volume is a significant contribution to ensur-
ing we don’t lose sight of this (though I cannot help noting the striking absence of 
an entry on G. E. Moore, and the striking paucity of discussion of Wittgenstein in 
Marie McGinn’s entry on Wittgenstein). Second, as mentioned already, the vol-
ume’s breadth is impressive. Of particular note is its coverage of recent important 
movements such as social epistemology, feminist epistemology, and experimental 
epistemology, as well as the entire section it devotes to formal epistemology.
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Perhaps the principal weakness of the volume is the inconsistency in cross-ref-
erencing. Some of the articles are filled with references to elsewhere in the volume, 
where issues discussed in passing are taken up more fully (for instance, Timothy 
McGrew’s piece on evidence is exemplary in this respect). Such cross-references 
are enormously helpful to someone trying to gain a clear view of how the different 
issues in epistemology fit together. And they are particularly crucial in a volume 
like this, where there is an inevitable degree of arbitrariness concerning how the 
articles are organized into sections. For example, the articles on contextualism and 
closure principles fall in the sections on knowledge attributions and formal episte-
mology respectively, rather than in either of the sections on skepticism. This is a 
perfectly reasonable way to carve things up, though it’s then largely down to cross-
referencing to guide a reader interested in skepticism to these other parts of the 
volume. However, most of the articles lack any such references. Jonathan Kvanvig’s 
piece on epistemic justification discusses coherentism, foundationalism, infinit-
ism, the Gettier problem, Quinean epistemology, and knowledge-first epistemol-
ogy, all topics with devoted entries in the volume, but without directing the reader 
to any of these entries. Paul Boghossian’s discussion of epistemic relativism briefly 
introduces Bayesian epistemology, but there’s no reference to Stephan Hartmann’s 
and Jan Sprenger’s more detailed and helpful introduction later in the volume. 
Peter Ludlow raises the Kripkenstein paradox in his discussion of semantic knowl-
edge, but the reader is left to figure out that there’s an entire article devoted to the 
problem later on. And so on. Now, it would obviously have involved an enormous 
amount of work to go through the finished articles and add substantial cross-refer-
ences to each, but the benefits to students using the volume would have been tre-
mendous. As it stands, most of the entries sit in curious isolation from each other. 
This is a shame.
I also found some of the articles rather misleading on points of significance. 
Now, many of the articles offer a somewhat opinionated treatment of their topic, 
which of course raises the potential for dissent, particularly if one is a somewhat 
opinionated reader! But I have in mind issues that arise even once we bracket these 
substantial points of disagreement. I’ll give just a couple of notable examples, 
which I think should have been picked up at an earlier point. First, Sandy Goldberg 
classifies Dretske’s displaced perception model of introspection as an “internal” or 
“inner” perception model, along with the Lockean accounts defended by Armstrong 
and Lycan (310). Treating these accounts together may be fine for certain purposes, 
but Goldberg then presents standard objections to Lockean accounts as if they are 
objections to “inner perception” models in general (311). This is not so; indeed, 
Dretske’s account was in part fashioned to avoid precisely the objections Goldberg 
raises. Second, Otávio Bueno’s article on logical and mathematical knowledge fails 
to adequately distinguish between the ambitions of Frege’s logicism and those of 
its neo-logicist descendents (359-60). Bueno correctly notes that while Frege starts 
with the inconsistent Basic Law V, neo-logicists take Hume’s Principle as basic, and 
he also notes in passing that they regard it as analytic. But this marks a point of 
considerable importance. Frege’s claim was that Basic Law V was not merely an 
analytic truth, but a logical one. Neo-logicists will stress that they claim no 
such status for Hume’s Principle, since the ‘number of ’ operator it introduces is not 
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logical. Rather, they’ll claim that Hume’s Principle enjoys a claim to be analytic 
because it implicitly defines the ‘number of ’ operator. This crucial point goes miss-
ing in Bueno’s discussion; the aim of Frege’s logicism is described as that of show-
ing “that arithmetical concepts [can] be reduced to logical concepts (such as 
identity, predication, negation, and conjunction) plus some definitions” (359), 
while the neo-logicist is portrayed as offering abstraction principles such as Hume’s 
Principle in order to show that “the relevant properties of the objects under consid-
eration can be adequately captured in terms of only logic and definitions” (360).
Let us now turn to the volume’s treatment of skepticism. There are two sections 
devoted to skepticism, with the first on varieties of skepticism and the second on 
attempted responses. The second section is strikingly thin, containing only three 
entries: one on anti-realist responses to skepticism, one on externalist responses, 
and one on responses drawing on content externalism. The first and third kinds of 
approach were very influential in their day, but neither seems to be currently all 
that popular, while a number of proposals that have been widely discussed in the 
past ten or twenty years aren’t covered here at all. For these reasons, I wasn’t con-
vinced that this section gave a particularly good overview of the present state of 
play. Now, some of the deficiencies of this section are partly addressed by articles 
elsewhere in the volume: for example, Patrick Rysiew’s excellent overview of epis-
temic contextualism in the section on knowledge attributions briefly discusses 
contextualist responses to skepticism (525-6). But a fuller treatment would have 
been welcome and, as noted above, readers are left to their own devices in finding 
the relevant discussion. Moreover, many important proposals simply aren’t cov-
ered at all. For example, aside from Richard Fumerton’s references to his own view 
in his article on externalist responses to skepticism, contemporary internalist 
responses to skepticism—Jonathan Vogel’s recent defence of inference to the best 
explanation, Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory, and Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, to 
take some notable examples—are simply ignored.
The prior section on varieties of skepticism is considerably more comprehen-
sive. Its opening article, Richard Bett’s overview of Pyrrhonian skepticism, offers a 
fascinating account of some of the internal tensions in Pyrrhonism (such as those 
concerning whether or not the adoption of skepticism is itself the adoption of a 
definite “dogmatic” stance). It also offers a detailed description of the Pyrrhonian 
Modes, which nicely complements the discussions of contemporary engagement 
with Pyrrhonian skepticism elsewhere in the volume (particularly the engagement 
with Agrippa’s trilemma in the section of the volume on the structure of knowl-
edge and justification). The other articles in this section cover Cartesian skepti-
cism, and skepticism about self-knowledge, other minds, induction, rule-following, 
and morality.
I found Fred Dretske’s article on skepticism about self-knowledge much too nar-
rowly focused to be satisfying. This is a particularly vibrant and important topic 
right now. There is considerable pressure on the traditional picture of the nature 
and scope of so-called privileged access stemming from content externalists, from 
Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument (briefly covered in Williamson’s article on 
knowledge-first epistemology (211-3)), and from the work of empirically minded 
philosophers such as Eric Schwitzgebel and Peter Carruthers. Despite this, the 
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traditional picture is still pretty entrenched amongst philosophers, and it under-
writes a number of significant positions in epistemology (including some, though 
certainly not all, of the moderate versions of foundationalism that have been 
defended recently). Sadly, Dretske’s article doesn’t address any of this, instead 
defending his own idiosyncratic form of skepticism about self-knowledge. Unlike 
the other articles in the volume, it seemed much more like a short research article 
than any kind of overview of the topic.
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord structures his discussion of moral skepticism in terms 
of a “standard account of the nature of knowledge” (464), which curiously turns 
out to be the traditional tripartite account, almost universally rejected nowadays 
due to Russell’s and Gettier’s counterexamples. However, it’s not clear why Sayre-
McCord takes the play with the JTB account to be necessary. He structures his dis-
cussion of skeptics about moral knowledge by classifying them according to 
whether they target the requirement of truth, belief, or justification. But this way of 
proceeding only requires that truth, belief, and justification are necessary for 
knowledge, and Russell’s and Gettier’s cases only call into question the claim that 
they are jointly sufficient. Moreover, I worry that structuring the debate in this way 
only courts confusion. Sayre-McCord’s discussion of skeptics who deny that 
any of our moral beliefs are justified soon gets caught up in the issue of what rea-
sons we have to think that our moral beliefs are “appropriately sensitive to the 
facts” (472). And we might think that one moral of Russell’s and Gettier’s examples 
is that these are distinct issues, since these examples show that one can have a 
belief that is true and justified but which nonetheless fails to be knowledge because 
it fails to be “appropriately sensitive to the facts.” The danger, then, is that structur-
ing the debate in terms of the JTB account invites us to fail to clearly distinguish 
between two somewhat different challenges to the possibility of moral knowledge: 
one that calls into question whether our moral beliefs can be justified, and a sec-
ond that calls into question whether they can be appropriately sensitive to the 
moral facts (assuming that there are such facts).
Recent discussions of skepticism have been disproportionately focused on 
Cartesian skepticism about the external world (particularly versions resting on 
epistemic closure principles). Despite the issues I have raised here, the volume suc-
ceeds in redressing the balance somewhat, painting skepticism as a pervasive, mul-
tifaceted, and historically rich set of problems. It does also have the effect of rather 
reinforcing the impression that philosophers are much better at generating skepti-
cal worries than they are at addressing them. Whether one finds this a disappoint-
ing or scandalous conclusion will depend on one’s conception of what philosophy 
can hope to achieve, and what constitutes philosophical progress. For my own part, 
I’m inclined to think that the discussions of the varieties and subtleties of skepti-
cism in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology reflect the achievements of epis-
temologists, rather than their failures.
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